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ABSTRACT. Genuine saving is a measure of net investment in produced, natural and
human capital. It is a necessary condition for weak sustainable development that genuine
saving not be persistently negative. However, according to data provided by the World
Bank, resource-rich countries are systematically failing to meet this condition. Alongside
the well-known resource curse on economic growth, resource abundance might have
a negative effect on genuine saving. In fact, the two are closely related, as future
consumption growth is limited by insufﬁcient genuine saving now. In this paper, we
apply the most convincing conclusion from the literature on economic growth – that it
is institutional failure that depresses growth – to data on genuine saving. We regress
gross and genuine saving on three indicators of institutional quality in interaction with
an indicator of resource abundance. The indicators of institutional quality are corruption,
bureaucratic quality and the rule of law. We ﬁnd that reducing corruption has a positive
impact on genuine saving in interaction with resource abundance. That is, the negative
effect of resource abundance on genuine saving is reduced as corruption is reduced.
1. Introduction
Genuine saving (hereafter GS) is an established measure of weak sustain-
able development. Weak sustainable development is built on the assump-
tion that different forms of capital are substitutable for each other
(Neumayer, 2003).1 Development is unsustainable if an economy’s total
stock of capital is eroded, which, for instance, will occur if the GS rate is
(persistently) allowed to drop below zero. Since GS was developed, the
World Bank (2004) has made retrospective calculations for more than 150
countries between 1970 and the present day. Although it ﬁnds that global
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GS has been consistently positive, over the whole of this period GS rates
have been alarmingly low and consistently negative in certain countries of
the world. Signiﬁcantly, these countries are also often resource-rich.
This observation is strongly reminiscent of the so-called ‘resource
curse’ hypothesis in the economic growth literature: the phenomenon that
resource-rich economies generally grow more slowly than resource-poor
economies. Indeed, the two phenomena are linked: ﬁrst, current genuine
savings should in theory be equal to growth in the present value of future
well-being along the optimal growth path of the economy, even though
empirical evidence does not fully ﬁt the theory (Ferreira and Vincent, 2005;
World Bank, 2005). In other words, countries with poor GS performance
should also perform poorly in terms of future economic growth. Second,
resource-abundant countries with slow growth in the past and negative GS
are unlikely to be able to sustain even their comparatively small increases
in income into the future.
The resource curse represents a puzzle since the free gift of nature
in the form of natural resource deposits should be a blessing, not a
curse to the economy. Unsurprisingly, the resource curse on economic
growth has generated a substantial literature over the past half-century
or more. Many explanations have been put forward and one can
broadly distinguish between more directly economic explanations and
political-economic explanations that highlight the role of policy and/or
institutional failure. Ultimately, it is difﬁcult to resist the conclusion that
it is political-economic failures that have been the root cause of slow
growth. We draw succour from this ﬁnding and examine whether low GS
rates in resource-rich countries can similarly be explained by particular
political and institutional failings. More speciﬁcally, we test whether
improving institutional quality in selected, distinctways leads resource-rich
countries to invest their resource rents more sustainably in other forms of
capital.
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) have made a useful ﬁrst attempt to
address these issues. They provide tentative evidence of an interaction
between a composite index of general institutional quality, also used by
Sachs and Warner (1995), and resource abundance in determining gross
saving/investment: resource-rich countries with good quality institutions
have enjoyed greater rates of gross investment and saving. We build
on Atkinson and Hamilton’s (2003) research in several ways. First and
foremost, we test whether this interaction holds for genuine saving as well
as gross saving/investment. Secondly, we test whether speciﬁc aspects of
institutional quality are more signiﬁcant than others in driving up GS. We
examine three indicators of institutional quality to assess which aspect of
institutional quality it is that matters most: corruption, bureaucratic quality
and the rule of law. Thirdly, whereas Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) use a
cross-section of period-average data, we use a panel of data spanning up to
115 countries and 18 years. This allows us to estimate the interaction with
more sophisticated econometric techniques that allow for country-speciﬁc
effects, which are likely to be correlated with both resource abundance and
institutional quality, and that allow for dynamic effects. Ourmost important
result is that resource-rich countries suffer from low GS rates, but that they
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can improve their performance by ﬁghting corruption, difﬁcult as this may
be in actuality.
Section 2 explains GS in more detail, and outlines the empirical ﬁnding
that resource abundance is negatively related to GS. Section 3 discusses
the resource curse in terms of the growth literature. Section 4 explains our
empirical strategy, section 5 outlines our results and section 6 provides a
discussion.
2. Genuine saving and resource abundance: the unsustainable
consumption of resource rents
The origins of GS can be traced back to the work of Solow (1974) and
Hartwick (1977),whowere concernedwithmaximising intertemporal social
welfare in an economy exploiting a non-renewable resource. Given a range
of simplifying assumptions,2 this is realised through an optimal mix of
consumption and investment. Total investment across the economy is the
sum of net changes in the capital stock valued at its shadow price. If
GS is persistently below zero, then the economy is certainly not weakly
sustainable (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). The World Bank calculations
of GS, which it now calls “adjusted net saving”, includes three forms of
capital: produced, natural andhuman.GS is computed as follows (appendix
I provides more details):
GS= investment in produced capital−net foreign borrowing
+net ofﬁcial transfers−depreciation of produced capital
−net depreciation of natural capital+ current education expenditures
World Bank GS estimates for the period 1970–2001 have shown signiﬁcant
differences from country to country. One important trend to emerge is that
resource-rich countries are the poorest genuine savers (see also Atkinson
and Hamilton, 2003). Figure 1 plots period-average GS rates (that is, GS
divided by gross national income) against resource abundance for 145
countries. Resource abundance is measured as the average share of fuel
and mineral product exports in total exports.
With the exception of Algeria and Guinea, for whom GS was just above
zero for the period 1970–2001, every country with an average share of
fuel and mineral exports in total exports of over 60% had negative GS. In
contrast, most resource-poor countries, especially the cluster of countries
with an average share of fuel and mineral exports in total exports of under
20%, had positive GS. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it must also be said that net
produced capital investment is often negative too. In other words, the total
‘man-made’ wealth of these countries is also decreasing, and the World
Bank’s estimates of net natural capital depreciation simply worsen the
situation. This is the case in Guinea-Bissau, for example. Nevertheless, one
important conclusion we can draw from the World Bank’s data is that the
countries with the greatest natural resource extraction are also the poorest
performers in terms of GS. Put another way, they are failing to invest a
2 See Dietz and Neumayer (2004).
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Figure 1. Resource abundance and genuine saving between 1970 and 2001 (data from
World Bank 2004)
sufﬁcient proportion of their resource rents into other forms of capital.
This is striking, because it bears a considerable similarity to arguments
made with respect to the effect of natural resource intensity on economic
growth.
It is important to note that the method the Bank applies to estimate
net depreciation of natural capital (price minus average cost times
amount of resource extraction) is likely to over-estimate the true extent
of depreciation in countries with a large stock of remaining resources
(Neumayer, 2000, 2003). This is because contrary to, for example, the user-
cost approach of the El Serafy (1981) method, it does not acknowledge
that resource extraction carries an element of both capital depreciation and
true income. However, lack of reserve data prevents us from adjusting
the GS ﬁgures and whilst the data published by the Bank are likely to
over-estimate natural capital depreciation and therefore under-estimate
GS rates in resource-rich countries, it is our view that the main result on
the interaction between institutional quality and resource abundance is
unlikely to change in qualitative terms if a different method for calculating
natural capital depreciation is used. One would have to be concerned
if the extent of under-estimation of GS were systematically correlated
with institutional quality, but we see no reason why this should be the
case.
3. The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis and policy failure
“One of the surprising features of economic life is that resource-poor
economies often vastly outperform resource-rich economies in economic
growth” (Sachs and Warner, 1995, p. 2). Instances of this can be found
throughout modern history, but it is especially true of the post-1970
period. Between 1970 and 1993, per capita GDP in resource-rich countries
grew around three times slower than it did in resource-poor countries
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(Auty, 2001). Perhaps this is because resource-abundancemasks underlying
trends in other determinants of economic growth such as trade policy and
government efﬁciency. However, Sachs and Warner (1995) demonstrated
that, even after controlling for these factors, resource-abundance is
negatively related to growth. The phenomenon has become known as the
‘resource curse’.
The fact that fuel and mineral-rich economies perform especially badly
in relation to resource-poor economies (Auty, 2001) is a paradox. On the
face of it, countries with abundant fuel and mineral resources ought to be
able to sustain rapid growth both in the short and medium-term, as long
as they invest the proceeds of their resource windfalls in other productive
forms of capital. A number of explanations for the resource curse have been
put forward. We are especially interested in these, because they may help
to cast some light on the causes of insufﬁcient GS in resource-rich countries.
A popular explanation surrounds the poor economic performance of
the natural resources sector – characterised by falling primary resource
prices (Prebisch, 1962), vulnerability to short-termprice ﬂuctuations (Sala-i-
Martin andSubramanian, 2003) and relatively sluggishdemand– compared
to the manufacturing sector. But we must ask why resource-rich countries
have not succeeded in diversifying? They ought to be able to invest their
resource rents in other forms of capital, and lay the foundations for faster
and sustainable growth.
One reason why they might not is the so-called ‘Dutch disease’,
whereby the discovery of new resource stocks leads the real exchange
rate (or real wages) to over-appreciate, which perversely causes the
tradeable non-resource sector to contract. Many economists believe that
the manufacturing sector (and indeed the service sector) produces more
positive externalities than the natural resources sector (e.g. learning-by-
doing). Thus the contraction of the manufacturing sector in relative terms
coulddepress economic activity (Hirschman, 1958;Matsuyama, 1992). From
an investment perspective, there may not be an incentive to invest in
manufactures under these circumstances. Resource-rich countries may also
lack the incentive tomakeproductive investments inhuman capital through
educational expenditure (Birdsall et al., 2001; Gylfason, 2001; Papyrakis and
Gerlagh, 2004a, 2004b). This may be connected to Dutch disease, insofar as
currency appreciation may reduce the relative rate of return to educational
investments.
However, it seems plausible that it is a failure of public policy causing this
underinvestment. Judicious management of natural resource endowments
can prevent the generation of too much income too quickly. In Norway,
for example, the government takes around 80% of resource rents in taxes
and fees and invests that amount in foreign assets (Gylfason, 2001). Either
governmentswith abundant natural resources are blind to theneed to invest
in produced and human capital because they see themselves in a ‘comfort
zone’, or they may even deliberately neglect to invest. Either way, this
leads us more generally to a political-economic explanation of the resource
curse.
The potential to ‘cash in’ on natural resourcesmay have an unsettling and
inhibiting effect on a country’s polity, leading to injudicious decisions on
38 Simon Dietz et al.
the economy. The availability of resource rents may give rise to corruption.3
There are multiple reasons why corruption may in turn slow economic
growth (Leite and Weidmann, 1999) by reducing investment and the
productivity of investment (Boycko et al., 1995; Mauro, 1995; Murphy
et al., 1993; Romer, 1994). Alternatively, Isham et al. (2003) have identiﬁed
wider political-economic explanations for the resource curse. Firstly, the
whole statemay be subject to a ‘rentier effect’. Stateswith abundantmineral
and oil reserves extract their revenues from resources that are concentrated
geographically and in terms of ownership. This reduces their incentive to
develop the governance mechanisms that enable general taxation. On the
opposite side, since the state sector tends to dominate, citizens have less
incentive to form a healthy ‘civil society’, an independent middle class fails
to develop, and technocratic and entrepreneurial talent remains captive
of state largesse in terms of employment and advancement opportunities
(Chaudhry, 1997). In addition, the government can rely on its resource
revenues to repress dissent, either throughbuyingoff opposition (oftenwith
high-proﬁle ‘white elephant’ infrastructure projects) or through violence.
As a result of this, democracy often fails to develop (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001).
More importantly in this context, stiﬂing technocratic and entrepreneurial
talent, as well as making unproductive ‘white-elephant’ investments, will
harm the economy.
Secondly, political elites ﬁnd it relatively easy to control resources and
maintain their wealth in a point resource-led economy, but face the prospect
of losing their grip through industrialisation and urbanisation (Acemoglu
et al., 2001; Moore, 1967). It follows that political elites in resource-rich
countries resist modernisation pressures for as long as possible, especially
investment in the manufacturing sector. Again, in this case civil society
fails to develop. The main reason for this is that the concentration of capital
ownership among political elites, together with production methods that
favour the use of expert (foreign) labour and that are capital-intensive (Auty
and Kiiski, 2001), reproduces social inequalities between those inside the
elite and those outside it.
Hence we are compelled to test whether the negative effect of resource
abundance on GS is explained by policy failure. In particular, we specify
a model to explain GS based on the interaction between natural resource
endowments and institutional quality. Atkinson andHamilton (2003) found
a signiﬁcant positive interaction between resource abundance and general
institutional quality on gross investment and saving. According to their
results, resource-rich countries with good quality institutions have enjoyed
greater rates of gross investment and saving. We extend their logic to
GS and also test whether some elements of institutional quality are more
important than others in explaining variations in GS. We test corruption,
based on the expectation that it will divert the proceeds of natural resource
liquidation away from investment in produced and human capital towards
consumption. We also test measures of bureaucratic quality and the rule
of law. Following Isham et al. (2003), we decline to apportion these three
3 Known as rapacious rent-seeking behaviour (Lane andTornell, 1996; Torvik, 2002).
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indicators to particular theories. Instead, we test whether it is indeed true
that these wider political economy effects depress GS, or whether it is
corruption in particular that matters.
4. Empirical strategy
We model variations in rates of gross savings and GS in a panel of
data spanning up to 115 countries and 18 years. We specify a reduced-
form model, with a particular focus on the interaction between resource
abundance and indicators of institutional quality. It is ultimately GS that
we are interested in. However, we start with gross savings, since it is
gross savings that “anchors” GS and we want to investigate whether
the interaction between resource abundance and indicators of institutional
quality impact the gross and GS rates differentially.
Determinants of (gross) saving
Within the last ﬁfteenyears, a numberof studieshave analysed the empirical
determinants of gross private or gross national saving4 using panel data
and reduced-form models (Edwards, 1996; Dayal-Gulati and Thimann,
1997; Loayza et al., 2000; Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991; Masson
et al., 1995; Haque et al., 1999; Samwick, 2000). Across all studies, four
variables appear to have a robust and signiﬁcant effect on gross saving:
(i) per capita income, (ii) economic growth, (iii) age dependency and
(iv) urbanisation. Income per capita and income growth have a positive
effect on gross (private) saving. Age dependency has a negative effect on
gross saving, and in the empirical studies, urbanisation tends to have a
negative effect on gross saving. A number of other variables are tested
in the above studies. We choose not to include them for three reasons.
Firstly, some are generally insigniﬁcant in the empirical literature. These
includemacroeconomic indicators such as interest rates and terms-of-trade.
Secondly, data availability for some variables is very limited. These include
detailed indicators of ﬁnancial liberalisation, social security systems and
income inequality. Thirdly, some are components of GS, and therefore
including them as independent variables effectively constructs a partial
identity with the dependent variable. These include ﬁscal policy variables
such as government consumption and ﬁscal surplus (see appendix I).
Hypothesis and data
We test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Resource-rich countries have higher rates of gross saving and
the effect is stronger the better is institutional quality.
Hypothesis 2 (main hypothesis): Resource-rich countries have lower rates
of genuine savings, but this effect is likely due to policy failure and raising
institutional quality in these countries will lead to greater investment of resource
rents in other forms of capital, and thus to higher rates of genuine saving.
4 Where gross national saving = gross private saving + gross public saving.
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We test these hypotheses with the following models
GrossSRi ,t = α + β1 lnYi ,t + β2Growthi ,t−1 + β3Agei ,t + β4Urbani ,t
+β5Insti ,t +β6Rsi ,t + β7Insti ,t ∗ Rsi ,t + Tt + εi ,t (1)
GSRi ,t = α + β1 lnYi ,t + β2Growthi ,t−1 + β3Agei ,t + β4Urbani ,t
+β5Insti ,t + β6Rsi ,t + β7Insti ,t ∗ Rsi ,t + Tt + εi ,t (2)
for country i at time t, where ε is an error term. The year dummiesT allow for
global changes in the gross savings and GS rates over time not otherwise
accounted for in the explanatory variables. GrossSR is the gross savings
rate, GSR is the GS rate. Data are taken from the World Bank;5 lnY is gross
national income per capita. We take the natural log to account for positive
skewness. Growth is GDP growth, which is lagged one year to mitigate
potential endogeneity bias; Age is the age-dependency ratio: the ratio of
dependants – people younger than 15 and older than 64 – to the working-
age population (those aged 15–64); Urban is a measure of urbanisation: the
percentage of the total population living in urban areas. Data for all these
variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
Online database (World Bank, 2004).
Inst is institutional quality. We separately test three indicators of
institutional quality. Indices of (i) lack of corruption, (ii) bureaucratic quality
and (iii) the rule of law are taken from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG). These are scaled from 0, which indicates poor quality institutions
(i.e. the highest corruption, the lowest bureaucratic quality and the absence
of rule of law) to 6, which indicates high quality institutions (i.e. the lowest
corruption, the highest bureaucratic quality and full rule of law).6 The
indices are compiled in an attempt to assess the investment risk faced by
multinational companies and are based on expert judgements. Insofar as
they ought to be positively related to investment, they are promising for
our purposes. Unfortunately, the ICRG variables are only available for the
period 1984 to 2001.
Rs: Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) use the value of resource rents. We
cannot take this measure since resource rents form part of GS and their
inclusion would lead to a partial identity of the left-hand and right-hand
sides of the estimating equation. Instead, we take the combined share
of fossil fuel and mineral products in total exports as our measure of
resource abundance (World Bank, 2004). This is similar to the measure
used by Sachs and Warner (1995) in their seminal paper and the most
widely used measure in the literature on the resource curse. The difference
is that we do not include agricultural products, the inclusion of which
has been widely criticised, as Sachs and Warner (2001) themselves admit.
Ideally, one would want to measure resource abundance with measures of
5 http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/envext.nsf/44ByDocName/
GreenAccountingAdjustedNetSavings
6 Until 1996, bureaucratic quality was scored 0–4.We rescale this data to lie between
0 and 6. However, none of the observations in our sample actually have a score of
zero.
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resource stocks, as others have noted before (Stijns, 2002; Bulte et al., 2005).
However, no comprehensive data on resource stocks exist. Our expectation
is that resource abundance as measured by the combined share of fossil
fuel and mineral products in total exports will be negatively associated
with the GS rate. This effect could be partly due to the way the World
Bank measures GS. As mentioned already, in subtracting the full resource
rents from gross savings, theWorld Bank employs a method for calculating
the value of natural resource stock depreciation that is likely to represent
an over-estimate and is thereby under-estimating the GS rate in resource-
abundant countries (see Neumayer, 2000, 2003). However, other methods
of accounting for natural resource stock depreciation are contestable as
well and/or are extremely data-intensive. For example, the El Serafy (1981)
method requires information on resource stocks, which are difﬁcult to
get, as mentioned above. Importantly, our main hypothesis is that the
negative effect of resource abundance is moderated by the degree of
institutional quality. For this conditional effect, the fact that the GS rate
is likely to be under-estimated for resource-abundant countries should not
matter, unless the under-estimation were systematically correlated with
institutional quality. We see no reason why this should be the case.
lnY, Growth, Age, and Urban are the control variables. Inst, Rs and
its interaction term are the main variables of interest. As noted above,
we expect Rs to have a negative effect on GS. However, if raising the
standard of institutions in resource-rich countries reduces the unsustainable
consumption of resource rents, then we would expect the interaction
term Inst∗Rs to be positive. Rs is the predictor variable and Inst is the
moderator variable, such that the negative relationship between resource
abundance andGS becomesmore positive – i.e. improves – the better are the
political institutions. Where the interaction term is signiﬁcant, one cannot
interpret the coefﬁcients on the individual components Rs and Inst in the
conventionalway. Instead, the coefﬁcient onRs in amodelwith a signiﬁcant
interaction term Inst∗Rs is the slope of Rs on GS when Inst is equal to zero.
Estimation strategy
We ﬁrst estimate the model with ﬁxed effects, a design that allows for
unobserved time-invariant variation in country-speciﬁc factors, with robust
standard errors. Secondly, we estimate the model using the Arellano-
Bond linear, dynamic panel-data estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This
accounts for the inertia that is almost certainly present in the determination
of saving rates (Loayza et al., 2000). The Arellano-Bond estimator is a
generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimator. It is constructed by
ﬁrst-differencing the dependent and independent variables. Although the
Arellano-Bond estimator has advantages over a static ﬁxed effects estimator,
it also suffers from problems. First-differencing wipes out the country
ﬁxed effects, but the lagged dependent variable is by deﬁnition correlated
with the error term such that further lags of the dependent variable
and ﬁrst differences of the exogenous explanatory variables are used as
instruments. This leads to rather inefﬁcient estimation with high standard
errors ifArellano andBond’s (1991) one-step estimatorwith robust standard
errors is used. The two-step estimator is much more efﬁcient, but can
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under-estimate the size of standard errors in small samples. As a result
of this, we report estimation results from both the one-step and the two-
step estimator. Moreover, whilst ﬁrst-order serial correlation is expected,
second-order serial correlation indicates that the original error term is
serially correlated, which renders the estimations inconsistent. In all our
estimations reported below we can reject the hypothesis of second-order
serial correlation at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
One potential problem is that institutional quality might be endogenous.
In other words, while institutional quality affects the GS rate, the GS rate
might also affect institutional quality. In econometric terms, this would
mean that institutional quality is correlated with unobserved variables
that enter the error term. As long as these unobserved variables are time-
invariant, this is not a problem sincewe use ﬁxed-effects or ﬁrst-differenced
models. It is possible, however, that unobserved variables vary over time.
Ideally, one would tackle this problem with the help of the instrumental
variables regression technique. The problem is that potential instruments
such as geography and historical information on settlermortality suggested
by the literature on the effect of institutions on growth are all time-invariant
and are used in cross-sectional regression analysis (Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Rodrik et al., 2004; Glaeser et al., 2004). It is not possible to estimate a ﬁxed-
effects instrumental variable regression model with instruments that do
not vary over time and we believe that controlling for ﬁxed effects is of
paramount importance to our estimations.
5. Results
Table 1 reports summary statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix.
Although the lack of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law indices
are all compiled by ICRG, the correlations between them are not especially
high. In particular, the strength of correlation between lack of corruption
and bureaucratic quality and between lack of corruption and the rule of law
is only moderate (0.54 and 0.52 respectively). Therefore there may indeed
be a possibility of detecting different effects between the various measures
of institutional quality and GS.
Table 2 presents the static ﬁxed effects estimations for the gross savings
rate, with columns 1–3 reporting results for each of the three indicators
of institutional quality. Looking initially at the control variables, GDP
growth is a signiﬁcant and positive determinant of the GrossSR in all
models, whereas the age-dependency ratio and the urbanization rate are
negative determinants. Resource-abundant countries do not have higher
rates of gross savings and there is no evidence for an interaction effect with
institutional quality either in static estimation.7
Perhaps this is because the static ﬁxed-effects estimation does not take
into account the dynamics of savings behaviour. Table 3 reports the results
of our estimations with the Arellano-Bond dynamic model. In this case, the
GrossSR is also regressed on itself and is positive andhighly signiﬁcant in all
7 We found no consistent evidence for a non-linear effect of resource abundance and











Table 1. Summary statistics and correlation matrix
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Gross Savings/GNI 1338 20.29 8.57 −33.04 54.23
Genuine Saving/GNI 1158 8.24 11.71 −54.89 44.32
GNI per capita (ln) 1338 7.98 1.46 4.70 10.69
GDP growth (lagged one year) 1338 3.40 4.09 −13.38 33.99
Age-dependency 1338 0.65 0.17 0.37 1.17
Urbanisation 1338 60.72 21.98 10.01 100
Resource exports 1338 21.99 26.85 0.02 99.70
Lack of corruption 1206 3.54 1.37 0 6
Bureaucratic quality 1338 3.87 1.45 1 6
Rule of law 1338 3.95 1.53 0 6
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
I: Gross Saving/GNI 1.00
II: Genuine Saving/GNI 0.59 1.00
III: GNI per capita (ln) 0.33 0.19 1.00
IV: GDP growth 0.24 0.15 −0.07 1.00
V: Age-dependency −0.47 −0.34 −0.73 −0.03 1.00
VI: Urbanisation 0.20 0.01 0.77 −0.09 −0.57 1.00
VII: Resource exports −0.05 −0.62 −0.13 −0.03 0.26 0.10 1.00
VIII: Lack of corruption 0.02 0.04 0.52 −0.07 −0.30 0.27 −0.18 1.00
IX: Bureaucratic quality 0.32 0.31 0.77 0.00 −0.64 0.48 −0.30 0.54 1.00
X: Rule of law 0.28 0.18 0.70 0.03 −0.62 0.46 −0.17 0.52 0.70 1.00
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GNI per capita (ln) 1.361 0.472 0.629
(0.903) (0.958) (0.927)
GDP growtht−1 0.141∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Age dependency −23.543∗∗ −20.914∗∗ −21.106∗∗
(4.920) (4.593) (4.741)
Urbanisation −0.219∗∗ −0.173∗ −0.159∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075)
Resource exports −0.015 0.014 0.007
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035)
Institutional quality 0.332 0.693∗ 0.356
(0.234) (0.312) (0.230)
Resource exports∗ −0.014 −0.015 −0.011
Inst. quality (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
R2 within 0.09 0.09 0.08
N observations 1222 1338 1338
N countries 107 115 115
Notes: Dependent variable is GrossSR (Gross Savings/GNI). Year-speciﬁc time
dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%,
∗∗ at 1%.
cases. Economic growth and the age-dependency ratio remain statistically
signiﬁcant determinants, but the urbanisation rate is only signiﬁcant in
model 1b. There is now evidence, if only in the more efﬁcient two-step
estimation, that resource abundance in interaction with lack of corruption
(model 1b) and the rule of law (model 3b) is associated with a higher gross
savings rate.
The results reported for gross savings are interesting, but ultimately it is
GS, not gross savings, that matters for weak sustainable development. The
question is whether our main hypothesis that posits an interaction effect
between resource abundance and institutional quality is corroborated by
empirical evidence or not.
Table 4 presents the static ﬁxed effects estimations for the GSR, with
columns 1–3 again reporting results for each of the three indicators of
institutional quality. Looking initially at the control variables, GNI per
capita and GDP growth are signiﬁcant and positive determinants of the
GSR in all models. The age-dependency ratio and the urbanization rate are
not signiﬁcant in any model. This is somewhat different from the GrossSR,
for which GNI per capita was insigniﬁcant, whereas the age-dependency
ratio and the urbanization rate were negative determinants. This would
suggest that gross and genuine savings are determined differently. In










Table 3. Dynamic Arellano-Bond estimates (gross savings rate)
‘Lack of corruption’ ‘Bureaucratic quality’ ‘Rule of law’
One-step Two-step One-step Two-step One-step Two-step
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
(GS/GNI)t−1 0.431∗∗ 0.429∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.411∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.454∗∗
(0.077) (0.021) (0.079) (0.015) (0.081) (0.019)
GNI per capita (ln) 0.312 −0.476 −0.139 −0.243 −0.125 −0.832
(1.277) (1.061) (1.498) (0.691) (1.357) (0.749)
GDP growtht−1 0.128∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.123∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.123∗ 0.137∗∗
(0.048) (0.016) (0.052) (0.013) (0.050) (0.012)
Age dependency −26.487∗ −29.047∗∗ −22.875∗ −12.578 −21.478∗ −20.099∗∗
(10.595) (6.928) (10.510) (6.983) (10.010) (7.481)
Urbanisation −0.221 −0.466∗∗ −0.081 0.078 −0.154 0.044
(0.193) (0.141) (0.214) (0.173) (0.198) (0.150)
Institutional quality 0.116 0.198 −0.158 −0.053 0.169 −0.403
(0.243) (0.216) (0.512) (0.362) (0.479) (0.350)
Resource exports −0.041 −0.039∗ 0.036 0.039 −0.016 −0.037∗
(0.063) (0.019) (0.056) (0.022) (0.073) (0.016)
Resource exports∗ 0.017 0.016∗∗ −0.006 −0.007 0.014 0.022∗∗
Inst. quality (0.013) (0.004) (0.017) (0.007) (0.019) (0.004)
Wald Chi2 219.5 4746.3 217.5 28683.5 209.1 20198.6
2nd order serial −0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.23
autocorrelation (0.9947) (0.9719) (0.9250) (0.8870) (0.8410) (0.8206)
N observations 1058 1058 1165 1165 1165 1165
N countries 99 99 107 107 107 107
Notes: Dependent variable is GrossSR (Gross Savings/GNI). Year-speciﬁc time dummies included. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (one-step estimation). ∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗ at 1%.
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GNI per capita (ln) 4.096∗∗ 3.453∗∗ 3.500∗∗
(1.059) (1.105) (1.063)
GDP growtht−1 0.149∗ 0.145∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
Age dependency −8.695 −6.083 −5.844
(5.765) (5.537) (5.654)
Urbanisation −0.082 −0.045 −0.046
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
Resource exports −0.279∗∗ −0.137∗∗ −0.163∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.047)
Institutional quality −0.367 0.391 0.266
(0.287) (0.351) (0.270)
Resource exports∗ 0.029∗ −0.021 −0.009
Inst. quality (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
R2 within 0.20 0.20 0.20
N observations 1036 1158 1158
N countries 99 107 107
Notes: Dependent variable is GSR (GS/GNI). Year-speciﬁc time dummies
included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗ at 1%.
is the interaction effect between the various indicators of institutional
quality and resource exports. The interaction between lack of corruption
and resource exports (column 1) is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. The interactions between bureaucratic quality and resource exports
(column 2) and between the rule of law and resource exports (column 3)
are not statistically signiﬁcant, however. There is no evidence here that
improvements in these aspects of the political economywill lead to a higher
GSR.
The speciﬁc interpretation of the statistically signiﬁcant interaction
variable between resource exports and the lack of corruption is that the
negative relationship between resource exports and the GSR diminishes –
i.e. becomes more positive – the less corruption there is. Reducing
corruption by one index point increases the slope of resource exports on
the GSR by 0.029 units. The coefﬁcient on resource exports shows the slope
of resource exports on the GSR at an index score of 0. Therefore, a one
percentage point increase in the resource exports to total exports ratio leads
to a decrease in the GSR of 0.28 percentage points in countries with themost
corruption. We can make use of the interaction-term coefﬁcient to estimate
the slope of resource exports on the GSR at higher scores on the index.
At the mean corruption index score of 3.6, a one unit increase in resource
exports leads to a decrease in the GSR of only 0.18 percentage points (0.28-
3.6∗0.029), and at the maximum index score of 6 (i.e. at the lowest level of
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corruption), a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in
the GSR of just 0.11 percentage points (0.28-6∗0.029). Reducing corruption
from the maximum to the minimum reduces the negative effect of resource
abundance on the GSR by 61%.
Table 5 reports the results of our estimations with the dynamic Arellano-
Bond model. Of the control variables, GNI per capita and urbanisation are
insigniﬁcant, GDPgrowth is signiﬁcant andpositive,while age dependency
is sometimes signiﬁcant and negative. The resources export variable is
negative throughout and statistically signiﬁcant with few exceptions. The
interaction effects between our institutional variables and resources exports
are not signiﬁcant in one-step estimation (columns 1a to 3a). However,
both the interaction effect between lack of corruption and resource exports
(column 1b) and between rule of law and resource exports (column 3b)
are positive and signiﬁcant in two-step estimation. According to these
estimations, for a one index point reduction in corruption, the slope of
resource exports on theGSR increases by 0.023 units. The respective increase
is 0.016 for a one index point improvement in the rule of law. When
corruption is at its highest – at an index score of zero – a one percentage
point increase in the ratio of resource to total exports leads the GSR to
fall by 0.21 percentage points. At the mean corruption index score of 3.6,
a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in the GSR of
0.15 points, and at the maximum index score of 6 (i.e. in the least corrupt
state), a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in the GSR
of merely 0.07 points. When the rule of law is at its worst value of zero, a
one percentage point increase in the ratio of resource to total exports leads
the GSR to fall by 0.19 percentage points. At the mean index score of 4.05,
a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in the GSR of
0.13 points, and at the maximum index score of 6 (i.e. when there is full rule
of law), a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in the
GSR of 0.09 points.
Looking at ﬁgure 1 shows that our measure of resource abundance is
highly skewed. Most countries have modest ratios of resource to total
exports (and mostly positive GS rates), whereas two dozen or so countries
have a very high resource exports to total exports ratio (andmostly negative
GS rates). One might be concerned that the skewness of this variable
inﬂuences our results. In sensitivity analysis, we have therefore taken the
natural log of the resource abundance variable and re-estimated all themod-
els. Results were little affected in qualitative terms. Interestingly, the inter-
action term between lack of corruption and the log of resource exports is
now statistically signiﬁcant even in Arellano and Bond’s (1991) one-step
estimator. One might be further concerned not only about outliers in terms
of resource abundance, but about outliersmore generally. If we additionally
exclude from the sample observations that have at the same time high
residuals and high leverage on the regression results following a criterion
described in Belsley et al. (1980), then again our results hardly change.8
8 The leverage of an observation is a multivariate measure of the distance between







Table 5. Dynamic Arellano-Bond estimates (genuine savings rate)
‘Lack of corruption’ ‘Bureaucratic quality’ ‘Rule of law’
One-step Two-step One-step Two-step One-step Two-step
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
(GS/GNI)t−1 0.356∗∗ 0.367∗∗ 0.359∗∗ 0.386∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.357∗∗
(0.093) (0.024) (0.077) (0.033) (0.081) (0.021)
GNI per capita (ln) 0.761 0.980 −0.269 −0.501 −0.246 −0.133
(1.912) (1.121) (2.195) (1.200) (2.002) (1.106)
GDP growtht−1 0.189∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.185∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.182∗∗
(0.084) (0.021) (0.076) (0.019) (0.074) (0.015)
Age dependency −32.655∗ −18.748 −28.770∗ −17.747 −28.890∗ −21.586∗
(15.588) (10.351) (14.279) (14.237) (14.017) (9.371)
Urbanisation −0.088 −0.000 −0.118 −0.095 −0.151 −0.058
(0.184) (0.126) (0.175) (0.150) (0.163) (0.124)
Institutional quality 0.304 −0.057 0.037 0.108 −0.064 −0.160
(0.325) (0.404) (0.622) (0.373) (0.471) (0.369)
Resource exports −0.201∗ −0.211∗∗ −0.129 −0.137∗∗ −0.174 −0.192∗∗
(0.083) (0.033) (0.079) (0.037) (0.090) (0.026)
Resource exports ∗ 0.013 0.023∗∗ −0.002 −0.003 0.014 0.016∗
Inst. quality (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.021) (0.008)
Wald Chi2 257.2 70919.0 254.9 8201.9 261.9 3545.4
2nd order serial −1.63 −1.67 −1.32 −1.32 −1.25 −1.22
autocorrelation (0.1033) (0.0948) (0.1864) (0.1863) (0.2113) (0.2218)
N observations 844 844 955 955 955 955
N countries 90 90 98 98 98 98
Notes: Dependent variable is GSR (GS/GNI). Year-speciﬁc time dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses
(one-step estimation). ∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗ at 1%.
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6. Conclusion
Resource-rich economies have historically grown more slowly than
resource-poor economies, particularly in the last thirty years or so. This
is apparently paradoxical, since resource extraction should generate the
income tomake productive investments in other forms of capital. Resource-
rich countries fail to do this. The World Bank’s data show that it is the
most resource-abundant countries of the world that have also been the
poorest genuine savers over the last thirty years, with many of them
having persistently negative GS rates. This amounts to an unsustainable
consumption of resource rents. More should have been invested in other
forms of capital, if these countries were to pursue a more sustainable
path. Also, in theory at least, GS performance today will impact future
growth performance, so without higher GS, resource-abundant countries
are likely to under-perform in terms of future growth relative to resource-
poor countries.
Although some direct economic explanations of the resource curse have
been put forward in the past with a modicum of success – most notably
‘Dutch disease’ effects – it is ultimately policy failure that underpins the
curse. This has inspired us to test whether improving institutional quality
has a positive effect on the relationship between resource abundance and
GS. We have presented evidence on the relationship between institutional
quality, resource abundance and GS (as well as gross savings). We asked
the question, does improving the quality of a country’s political and
bureaucratic institutions in various dimensions mitigate the negative effect
of resource abundance on the GSR? Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) paved
the way for our paper by offering tentative evidence of an interaction
between institutional quality in general and resource abundance in
determining gross saving/investment: resource-rich countries with good
quality institutions have enjoyed higher rates of gross investment and
saving. This result was derived in a cross-sectional setting, which might be
misleading if the explanatory variables are correlated with country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed effects. Our panel data design allowed us to control for both country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed and dynamic effects. We ﬁnd some, if limited, evidence that
resource abundance in interaction with institutional quality is associated
with a higher gross savings rate.
However, it is ultimately genuine savings, not gross savings, that matters
for weak sustainable development and we have therefore estimated the
impact of the interaction of resource abundance and institutional quality
on the GSR. Also, institutional quality is a broad concept and we have
attempted to discriminate between different aspects. There are persuasive
theoretical and empirical arguments in the literature that suggest corruption
may be a major explanatory factor in the resource curse. They often
describe a process inwhich investment is eithermisdirected or discouraged
altogether. A failure to invest resource rents would depress GS, ceteris
in absolute terms than twice the square root of k/n are excluded, where k is the
number of independent variables and n the number of observations, and where
DFITS is deﬁned as the square root of (hi/(1 – hi)), where hi is an observation’s
leverage, multiplied by its studentized residual.
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paribus. In addition, there are arguments forwider political economy effects,
summarised in Isham et al. (2003). These explain the resource curse in
terms of the control exerted by political elites over resource rents. There
is little incentive to develop a competent government bureaucracy and to
diversify the national economy into other sectors, a process that the political
elites resist through a combination of undemocratic decision-making and
repression of more-or-less violent forms.
We have therefore tested three different indicators of institutional quality
in the framework of our hypothesis, employing corruption, bureaucratic
quality and rule of law indices from ICRG. On the basis of our evidence,
we suggest that corruption is a signiﬁcant cause of a low GSR in resource-
rich countries. There is also some limited, but not robust, evidence that
improving the rule of lawmight have a similar effect to reducing corruption.
In a nutshell, the message of our paper is that resource-rich countries
can improve their weak sustainability performance by ﬁghting corruption,
difﬁcult as this may be. They should ratify and take serious steps to
implement the recently negotiated UN Convention against Corruption
(www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_convention_corruption.html). It is also
encouraging to see that theWorldBankhaspromised as part of its Extractive
Industries Review to require lending countries to undertake proper and
transparent revenue accounting (www.worldbank.org/ogmc/), but one
wished it had taken a more outspoken view toward the need to ﬁght
corruption in resource-rich countries. This is not to say that countries
should only focus on anti-corruption measures: there are many other
very persuasive reasons why all aspects of institutional quality should be
improved. Indeed, improvements on one dimension are almost certain to
lead to improvements in others. Nevertheless, in order to put themselves
on a more sustainable investment pathway, we recommend that resource-
rich countries as a priority strive to reduce the corrupt practices that stymie
investment and make it unproductive.
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Appendix I. World Bank estimates of GS
Investment in produced capital, net foreign borrowing and net ofﬁcial transfers are
obtained from thenational accounts.Although depreciation of produced capital
is not, estimates can be derived from data on produced capital formation.
The World Bank uses estimates made by the United Nations Statistics
Division. Note that net investment in produced capital and foreign assets is
aggregated across both the private and public sectors. This means that we
are not able to use government consumption or investment to explain GS
rates.
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Net depreciation of natural capital can be divided at a basic level into
resource extraction on the one hand and environmental pollution on the
other. The latter is conceptualised as the use of sink capacity in order for
it to be equivalent to capital depreciation. The Bank estimates resource
extraction for a range of fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, hard coal and brown
coal), minerals (bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, zinc, phosphate, tin, gold
and silver), and one renewable resource (forests). Depreciation of natural
capital due to resource depletion is computed as the product of price
minus average costs of extraction multiplied by the volume of extraction:
(P-AC)∗R, where P is the resource price, AC is average cost and R is the
volume of extraction (in the case of a renewable resource R represents
harvest beyond natural regeneration). Average costs are used instead of the
theoretically correct marginal costs due to a lack of data. Environmental
pollution is taken to be the estimated damage cost of carbon dioxide
emissions, where each metric tonne of carbon emitted is valued at US$20.
This value is taken from Fankhauser (1995) and is below the median of the
more recent meta-analysis of studies estimating the marginal damage of
carbon contained in Tol (2005). Note that we omit the damage cost from
carbon dioxide emissions from the estimation of GS, following Ferreira and
Vincent (2005). This is justiﬁed because the damage cost of climate change
to the environmental capital stock of a country is not equivalent to the
damage of its emissions. Instead, it is the global concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere, a function of global emissions, which matters,
in combination with the country-speciﬁc vulnerabilities to climate change,
which are difﬁcult to model. Empirically, it makes almost no difference to
our estimations if the cost of carbon dioxide emissions is included in the GS
measure.
Investment in human capital is calculated as net educational expenditures.
This includes both capital expenditures as well as current expenditures
that are counted as consumption rather than investment in the traditional
national accounts. This is regarded as a ﬁrst approximation to the full value
of human capital investment, which is difﬁcult to measure precisely.
